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This paper studies a model of memory. The model takes into account that
memory capacity is limited and imperfect. We study how agents with such
memory limitations, who have very little information about their choice
environment, play games. Our results suggest that players do better in
games than in decision problems because of their ability to in‡uence the
environment they face. We also show that people can do quite well even
with severely limited memory, although memory limitations tend to make
them behave cautiously.1 Introduction
It is widely acknowledged that memory limitations a¤ect our behavior. In
this paper we develop a model of memory which explicitly takes into account
that memory capacity is limited. Even this limited capacity is imperfect, in
the sense that arbitrary items in memory may be forgotten. We study how
players with such memory limitations play games.
We suppose that a player’s memory contains, for each of her strategies, a
record of a …nite number of the most recent payo¤s obtained. New informa-
tion leads to the deletion of old information. Players do not actively select
which payo¤s to store in their memories. Nor do they store “processed” in-
formation in the form of summary statistics of their past experiences. The
players are not sophisticated. By not storing processed information, they
are probably not making e¢cient use of their limited memory. When they
think back they only recall the most recent payo¤s they have experienced
from each strategy.
The players repeatedly play the same normal form game in which each
knows only the strategies available to her. At each stage the players choose
a strategy and receive a payo¤. The payo¤ each player obtains depends on
the chosen strategy pro…le. At the time of making their choices the players
do not know the choices of others. The players are not assumed to know
the payo¤ functions of other players, or even the strategies available to their
opponents. They need not even observe the strategy pro…le chosen by their
opponents. In fact, they do not even need to know that they are playing a
game.
The players choose among their strategies on the basis of what they re-
member about the performance of di¤erent strategies. We suppose that how
an agent evaluates any particular strategy is monotonic in payo¤s. Roughly
speaking, monotonicity requires that an agent evaluates a strategy as bet-
ter if it has given higher payo¤s. An example of a monotonic rule is the
evaluation of each strategy according to the average payo¤ that the strategy
has received in the past. Other examples of monotonic rules are evaluations
according to the minimum payo¤, the maximum payo¤ or the sum of payo¤s
that the strategy has received in the remembered past. We suppose that the
players choose, at each time, the strategy they evaluate as being the best.
That is, we assume the players are myopic.1
Our …rst result concerns the model in which agents have limited memory
1Myopia also explains why the players do not attempt to store summary statistics:
The e¢cient storage of information, for possible use in the future, cannot possibly be a
concern of a myopic agent.
1capacity but are not forgetful in the sense that they do not forget arbitrary
items in their memory.2 We show that players converge to play a limited
memory equilibrium (LME). An LME is a strategy pro…le which is associated
with an absorbing state of the dynamics describing how memory and play
evolve over time. We show that a strategy pro…le is an LME if and only
if each player obtains at least her maxmin payo¤s.3 We also show that
play must converge to an LME, starting from any initial state, if players
use monotonic evaluation rules. This result contrasts with that obtained by
Sarin (1999) who shows that, in a decision problem, a player converges to
choose her maxmin strategy. Intuitively, the superior performance of agents
in games as opposed to decision problems arises as in the former players
may, unsuspectingly, in‡uence and improve the nonstationary environment
they face, whereas in the latter they cannot possibly alter the stationary
environment with which they are confronted.
We refer to a strategy pro…le that forgetful players may play as a stable
limited memory equilibrium (SLME). The set of strategy pro…les that are
SLME is contained in the set of strategy pro…les that are LME. In general,
sets of SLME depend on monotonic evaluation rules as they depend on the
cardinal properties of payo¤s. Hence, we begin by considering particular
evaluation rules. We show that if players use the maximum rule, and have a
large enough memory, then the unique SLME in games of common interest
is the strategy pro…le that induces the Pareto–optimal outcome. If players
use the minimum rule we show that the strategy pro…le in which each player
plays her maxmin strategy is an SLME and that it is the unique SLME if
maxmin play constitutes a Nash equilibrium. This implies, for example,
that such players will choose the risk–dominant equilibrium in 2x2 games in
which risk- and payo¤–dominance con‡ict. Hence, larger memories and the
use of the “optimistic” maximum rule result in more preferred outcomes.
A class of games in which the set of SLME do not depend on the partic-
ular evaluation rule used is de…ned by iterated uniform dominance (IUD).
We say a strategy s is uniformly dominated if there exists another strat-
egy whose minimum payo¤ is larger than the maximum payo¤ that may be
obtained from s. Eliminating a uniformly dominated strategy may make
another strategy uniformly dominated. If we iteratively eliminate all of the
strategies that are uniformly dominated then we obtain the set of strategies
that survive the process of IUD. If this set is a singleton, we say that the
2This model is studied in decision problems in Sarin (1999).
3The maxmin payo¤ for a player is the highest minimum payo¤ she can guarantee
herself when using only pure strategies. The strategy that ensures a player her maxmin
payo¤ is referred to as her maxmin strategy.
2game is solvable by IUD.4 For the class of uniformly dominance solvable
games, we …nd that the unique Nash equilibrium is an SLME regardless of
evaluation rules and memory capacities. For the larger class of dominance
solvable games, we show that if players use the minimum evaluation rule,
the Nash equilibrium is an SLME.
Two recent papers have focused on studying the implications of mem-
ory limitations in decision theoretic environments. Sarin (1999) studies the
model with limited memory capacity without additional forgetfulness that
we consider. The decision rules he considers and the information he assumes
the decision maker has of her environment, are identical to those considered
in this paper. In contrast to the aspects of memory we focus on, Mul-
lainathan (1998) focuses on rehearsal (recalling a memory increases future
recall probabilities) and association (events more similar to current events
are easier to recall). The agents he considers are considerably more sophisti-
cated: They use Bayes’ rule and are assumed to know much more about their
environment. Mullainathan uses his model to explain certain regularities in
income and consumption data, and some aspects of asset pricing.5
Several papers have studied players with memory limitations in game
theoretic environments. Young (1993) assumes that players are selected from
populations to play a game. When called upon to play, a player samples a
…xed number of the choices her opponents made in the recent past. This
…nite sample forms the player’s memory of the past play of the game. The
agent best replies to her memory. After making a choice the individual
forgets everything. The model is used to explain the evolution of mutually
consistent behavior in a population.6 Whereas we focus on the implications
of an agent’s memory limitations on her choice, Young’s model describes the
implications of limitations of “social memory”. Also, the players studied by
Young are more sophisticated than those we consider. A paper in which
agents are assumed to have bounded memory and in which they best-respond
is Sela and Herreiner (1999). They study agents who use the …ctitious
play algorithm but have bounded recall. More sophisticated players with
4This solution concept has been independently suggested by Friedman and Shenker
(1998), who refer to the set of strategies surviving IUD as the serially unoverwhelmed set.
Chen (1999) has found the solution concept to be of use for explaining experimental data
of public goods pricing mechanisms and Greenwald, Friedman and Shenker (1998) have
studied its relevance in network contexts.
5The paper by Dow (1991) contrasts with both of these studies. Rather than beginning
with a model of memory and analyzing its implications for choice, he begins with a decision
maker facing a particular (search) problem, and studies how she may optimally use her
limited memory.
6A similar model is studied by Hurkens (1995).
3bounded recall have been studied by Aumann and Sorin (1989), Lehrer
(1988, 1994) and Sabourian (1998).7
Osborne and Rubinstein (1998) consider agents who have about the same
level of sophistication as the agents we consider. They know the actions
available but do not know that they are playing a game. They choose each
action a …xed, …nite number of times and evaluate each action according to
the sum of payo¤s it has given. The action thought to be the best is chosen.
They introduce an equilibrium notion relevant for such players and study it’s
properties.8 To compare our model with theirs, it is useful to consider the
initial memory of our players. One possibility is that their initial memory
arises exactly according to the Osborne and Rubinstein procedure, in which
each agent chooses each action a …xed, …nite number of times. In contrast
to Osborne and Rubinstein, we allow that agents evaluate the payo¤s in
their memory in a large variety of ways. Also, in contrast to their static
equilibrium notion, the equilibrium notion(s) introduced in this paper are
derived as the limiting (absorbing) states of the large class of dynamics we
consider and in which the memories of the players are endogenously evolving.
This paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the basic
model. Section 3 characterizes LME. Section 4 introduces additional forget-
fulness and focuses on SLME, and Section 5 provides results about SLME in
games solvable by IUD and by iterated strict dominance. Section 6 discusses
possible extensions and limitations and Section 7 concludes.
2 The Model
Consider a …nite normal form game ¡ = (I; S; u), where I = (1; :::; n)
denotes the set of players with typical element i. S = £iSi is the set of
possible strategy pro…les in the game and Si is player i’s set of strategies.
A typical element of S is given by s =
¡
si; s¡i¢
where si 2 Si denotes
the strategy of player i and s¡i speci…es the strategies of players other
than player i. S¡i is the set of strategy combinations available to players
other than i. We shall suppose that player i has Ji available strategies.
By u we denote the payo¤ players receive from alternative strategy pro…les.
Speci…cally, the payo¤ that player i obtains in the strategy pro…le s is given
7Some of the issues that arise in studying agents with imperfect recall are discussed by
Piccione and Rubinstein (1997).
8Osborne and Rubinstein do not provide an analysis of how the equilibrium comes
about. This is done in a paper by Sethi (1999) who describes the dynamics in a large
population setting.
4by ui (s) = ui ¡
si; s¡i¢
. That is, ui : S ! <, and u = £iui. Clearly,
u : S ! <n.
The players have limited memories. Each player i associates with each
strategy H payo¤s. These will be the most recent H payo¤s the player





payo¤s that player i associates with strategy si at time t = 0; 1; 2; :::; and
let mj(si;t) be the jth element of this vector, j = 1;2:::;H. Furthermore,












be the state of player i’s memory at
time t. We shall suppose that the initial contents of the memory of the
players is given and satis…es the condition that for each player i and each
si 2 Si, mj(si;0) = ui(si;s¡i) for some s¡i. That is, each payo¤ that the
agent has in her initial memory of strategy si is a payo¤ that si can actually
obtain. This restriction on initial memory can be thought of requiring a
certain degree of realism, and it can be justi…ed by assuming that each agent
has been endowed with a number of random observations from the actual
game matrix. Alternatively, we may suppose that the initial conditions are
realized as a consequence of a period in which the players experiment with
all of their strategies.
Such memory allocation supposes that players recall only their payo¤ ex-
periences with di¤erent strategies, and that they recall only the most recent
payo¤ experiences with any particular strategy.9 Payo¤s obtained earlier
are forgotten. As some strategies may not have been chosen for a long time
such memory use implies that the decision maker recalls as many payo¤s
from recently chosen strategies as from those she has chosen only in the
distant past.10 Modelling memory allocation in this manner makes compar-
isons between di¤erent strategies straightforward: The decision maker has
only to compare payo¤ vectors with the same number of elements. Con-
siderations involved in comparing strategies regarding which the agent has
di¤erent amounts of information do not have to be addressed in this model.
Each player evaluates her strategies according to a monotonic evaluation
rule. An evaluation rule is monotonic if it evaluates a strategy as better if
it has yielded higher payo¤s in the (remembered) past.
De…nition 1 An evaluation rule f : <H ! < is monotonic if whenever
f (x) = f (y), x not necessarily equal to y, then for all h ¸ 0, h 2 <H,
f (x + h) ¸ f (y), and if h > 0 then f (x + h) > f (y).
9Observe that we assume that players experience no problems in retrieving objects in
their memory.
10In Section 6 we discuss models of memory allocation in which the decision maker
remembers a di¤erent number of payo¤s from di¤erent strategies.
5An example of a monotonic evaluation rule arises when a player evaluates
a strategy according to the average payo¤ it has given her in her remembered
past. We call this evaluation rule the average rule. Another monotonic
evaluation rule arises when an agent evaluates each strategy according the
minimum payo¤ it has given her in the remembered past. We shall call
this the minimum rule. Yet another monotonic evaluation rule lets an agent
evaluate a strategy according to the maximum payo¤ it has given her in the
remembered past. We shall call this the maximum rule.11
We shall assume that at each time each player chooses the strategy which
she evaluates as being best. That is, agents are assumed to be myopic. In the
context of our model, myopia can be justi…ed as the agents have very little
information about the payo¤ functions they are facing and, as a consequence,
experience large amounts of subjective uncertainty.12 We shall suppose that
if a player evaluates more than one strategy as being best, then the player


















be the set of strategies whose evaluation is the highest at time t. With this
notation we can easily de…ne a player’s decision rule: At time t+1 player i
plays strategy si
j with probability 0 if si
j = 2 Bi(mi(t)) and with probability
pi
j > 0 if si




A state at time t is described by the contents of all players’ memories
at that time, i.e., by m(t) = £i2Imi (t). Let M denote all possible con-
stellations of m. Note that, m(t) does not reveal which strategy pro…le
will be played in period t. Rather it induces a distribution over the set of
strategy pro…les according to which players will play in t. The support of
this distribution is given by B(m(t)) = £iBi(m(t)). This, in turn, induces
a probability distribution over M. The de…nitions of the game, of players’
memories, evaluation and decision rules together de…ne a Markov process P
on a …nite state space M.
11Pessimistic players (i.e. players who always “expect the worst”) would tend to adopt
the minimum rule, while optimistic players (i.e. players who always “expect the best”)
would tend to adopt the maximum rule.
12Sonsino (1998) has shown that “strong” uncertainty may lead a non–myopic agent
to behave in a myopic manner. Ellison (1997) has studied situations in which a rational
non–myopic player may behave in a myopic manner.
13Players are assumed to randomize independently of other players in such situations.
63 Limited Memory Equilibrium
The equilibrium concept we develop in this section is appropriate to describe
the strategy pro…les that players with limited memories will converge to play
if each uses some monotonic evaluation rule.14 We begin by characterizing
the absorbing states of M. Let Ui (s) denote an H–vector consisting of ui (s)
in every component. We say a game is generic if all payo¤s any speci…c player
can get are distinct.
Lemma 1 In generic games a state m is absorbing if and only if
(i) B(m) is a singleton, i.e., B(m) = fsg for some s, and
(ii) m(si) = Ui (s) for all player i.
Proof. If : From (ii) it follows that if players play s the state of memory
does not change and (i) ensures that players do play s.
Only if : Suppose there was an absorbing state not ful…lling (i) or (ii).
If (i) was not ful…lled there would be a positive probability for at least one
player to experience di¤erent payo¤s from one and the same strategy which,
in generic games, implies a positive probability for her memory to change.
If (ii) was not ful…lled but (i) was, m(si) would change with probability 1
for some player i. 2
We shall refer to a strategy pro…le as a limited–memory equilibrium
(LME) if it is played in an absorbing state.
De…nition 2 A strategy pro…le s is an LME if there exists an absorbing
state m with B(m) = fsg.
LME need not exist in all games. For example, an LME fails to exist in
the usual, non–generic, version of matching pennies. It is, however, possible
to see that LME exist in all generic games.15 An easy way to see this is to
note that in generic games the maxmin strategy for each player is unique.
The strategy pro…le in which each agent plays her maxmin strategy is an
LME as the next result reveals. The result characterizes the set of LME in
terms of payo¤s the players obtain in them. Let ui
min(si) denote the mini-
mal payo¤ si can give to player i, i.e., ui
min(si) = mins¡i2S¡i ui(si;s¡i). The
14Di¤erent players may use di¤erent evaluation rules.
15A de…nition of equilibrium that would allow for existence in all games would require
us to introduce a setwise analogue of the de…nition of LME, based on absorbing sets rather
than absorbing states. A setwise equilibrium notion, however, would lead to signi…cantly
more cumbersome notation, without adding signi…cantly to the insight. We choose, rather,
to focus mainly on generic games where all absorbing sets are singletons as shown below.
7maximal payo¤ si can give is de…ned analogously and denoted by ui
max(si).
By ui
maxmin = maxsi2Si ui
min(si) we denote player i’s maxmin payo¤. The
set of strategies yielding this payo¤ as their minimal payo¤ is denoted by
Si
maxmin, with typical element si
maxmin. In generic games Si
maxmin is a sin-
gleton for each player i.
Proposition 1 In generic games a strategy pro…le s is an LME if and only
if ui(s) ¸ ui
maxmin for all i.
Proof. If : Let m(si) = Ui(s) and let m(e si) = Umin(e si) for all strategies e si
other than si and for all i. Note that ui
maxmin > ui
min(e si) as no two payo¤s
are equal. As ui(s) ¸ ui
maxmin it follows that m(si) > m(e si) for all e si and
all i. By monotonicity of f it follows that Bi(m) =
©
siª
for all i, i.e., that
B(m) = fsg. Hence, by Lemma 1 the result follows.
Only if : Suppose the opposite. That is, suppose that some player i
gets less than her maxmin payo¤ in a strategy pro…le s which is an LME.
This implies that m(si) = Ui(s). Since Ui(s) < m(si
maxmin) it follows by
monotonicity of f that Bi(m) 6= fsg. Hence, by Lemma 1 s cannot have
been an LME.¤
Proposition 1 characterizes LME in terms of payo¤s each player must
obtain. This makes it easy to check whether a strategy pro…le is an LME.
The result shows that the players cannot do “too badly” in any LME. Specif-
ically, in an LME each player obtains a payo¤ at least as high as her maxmin
payo¤.16 This contrasts in a surprising way with the result obtained in Sarin
(1999) concerning games against nature.
Sarin shows that, in a game against nature, a player converges to choose
the strategy that gives her the maxmin payo¤. That is, the player converges
to her maxmin strategy. First, he shows that the individual cannot con-
verge to play any strategy other than her maxmin strategy. Suppose to the
contrary. Then she will experience from this strategy a long enough run of
the worst possible payo¤ from this strategy so that the worst payo¤ is all
the decision maker remembers from this strategy. At this time, or earlier,
the individual must evaluate her maxmin strategy (or some other strategy)
as being better. Hence, the individual cannot converge to play any strat-
egy other than her maxmin strategy. Next, consider a state in which the
player currently evaluates the maxmin strategy as being the best and eval-
uates every other strategy as being worse than the maxmin strategy could
16Note that the maxmin payo¤ we de…ne does not coincide with the (minimax) value
of a zero-sum game. This is because mixed strategies are allowed in de…ning the value of
a game.
8possibly be evaluated. In such a state the individual chooses the maxmin
strategy forever. Sarin shows that such a state is reached from any other
state with probability one.
Proposition 1 shows that players may play strategies other than their
maxmin strategies if the payo¤s they obtain by these strategies are higher
than their maxmin payo¤s. Hence, when facing a game environment agents
do better than when facing the decision theoretic environment. Intuitively,
this happens since players may (unsuspectingly) in‡uence the nonstationary
game environment they face. What is surprising is that they only in‡uence
it in a way that “improves” it. That is, players only “reinforce” strategy
pro…les that lead to outcomes better than the maxmin outcomes. Another
reason for the superior performance in games is that other players (typically)
choose deterministically, whereas in a game against nature, the other player
(“nature”) chooses stochastically. Hence, players do better in nonstationary
deterministic environments than in stationary stochastic environments.
An example which illustrates Proposition 1 and which also reveals that
LME do not have to be Nash equilibria, is obtained by considering the
Prisoner’s Dilemma game. The payo¤ from mutual cooperation is greater
for each player than the maxmin payo¤ and hence mutual cooperation is an
LME. For example, cooperation can be sustained in an LME when all players
remember from the strategy “defect” only the mutual defection payo¤.
In non–generic games, a pure Nash equilibrium is not necessarily an
LME. To see this, simply consider a degenerate 2x2 game in which the row
player receives the same payo¤ for all strategy combinations. The column
player prefers left over right when the row player plays up and vice versa
for down. This game has two Nash equilibria in pure strategies but neither
is an LME. To see this consider the equilibrium (up;left). Obviously, the
row player’s memory state is time–invariant. As the row player always as-
signs positive probability to both his strategies, there is always a positive
probability that the column player’s memory for strategy left will change.
Hence, the equilibrium is not an LME.
While not every Nash equilibrium is necessarily an LME, every strict
equilibrium is an LME. To see this, consider ui(s) > ui(e si;s¡i) for all e si
and for all player i. Now consider a state where m(si) = Ui(s) for all i and
where m(e si) = Ui(e si;s¡i) for all e si and for all i. By monotonicity of f it
follows that B(m) = fsg such that m cannot be left. Hence, the strict Nash
equilibrium is also an LME.
We now show that players who use monotonic evaluation rules converge
to some LME.
9Proposition 2 In generic games, starting from any initial state play con-
verges to an LME.
Proof. First, we show that play cannot converge to any state that is not an
LME. Suppose play converges to a state in which (at least) one player i gets
a payo¤ below her maxmin payo¤ ui
maxmin. Then her memory would contain
only this payo¤ after at most H periods. But then the agent would evaluate
her maxmin strategy as better, because she uses a monotonic evaluation
rule. Hence play cannot converge to any state in which any player gets a
payo¤ below her maxmin payo¤.
Next, we argue that play cannot cycle among strategies. Suppose that
play cycles between some strategies which includes strategy si
j for player









for all j 6= k at any
time. In this case, each time the agent returns to choose a strategy, the
evaluation of it must have strictly declined. This is because a player only
leaves a strategy after its evaluation has strictly declined, given that the
evaluations of unplayed strategies stay unchanged. Hence, the next time
the player chooses a strategy it must be evaluated as strictly worse. Given
that the game is …nite and that the memory of each player is …nite, the
evaluation of any strategy cannot keep strictly declining in…nitely often.
Hence, if play was to cycle (perhaps, probabilistically), then some player
i must return to a state in which she evaluates two (or more) strategies
equally. If this were not the case then player i would return to a strategy
in…nitely often when its evaluation had strictly declined. But this cannot
happen by the argument in the preceding paragraph. Hence, if we show that
no player can choose a strategy in…nitely often because it is evaluated the
same as some other strategy, then the proof of the Proposition is complete.














for all sl, j 6= k 6= l, an in…nite number of times, with probability 1.














for some j 6= k 6= l, in…nitely often. Then,
i will choose both si
j and si
k in…nitely often as she chooses each strategy
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other player(s) must also be randomizing among strategies they evaluate
the same. Note that the other player(s) need not randomize in m. As the
randomizations of player i and the other players are independent, at each
time there is a positive probability that player i obtains H identical payo¤s
from H consecutive choices of si. From such an “event” the player would end
up remembering only one payo¤ from si. If the agent continues to evaluate
si
j and si
k the same, consider another sequence of H rounds in which the
player obtains the same payo¤ from the other strategy. Such a sequence of
play, which has positive probability, ensures that the player remembers only
one payo¤ from si
j and one payo¤ from si
k. Over the in…nite repetition of the
game, such an event has probability 1 (if the players continue to evaluate the
two strategies the same). At that time, or earlier, player i will not evaluate
the two strategies the same. Hence, no player can return to a state in which
she evaluates two or more strategies as being the best in…nitely often. 2
Hence, play must at some time settle upon an LME. 2
4 Stable LME
So far we have studied players whose memory capacity is limited. In this
section we shall assume that memory is also imperfect, in the sense that
arbitrary items in the memory may be forgotten at any time.17 Speci…cally,
we shall assume that each item, in each player’s memory, is forgotten with
some small probability ", and is forgotten independently of the others.18
Further, we suppose that if an item associated with strategy si is forgotten,
then it is replaced by another payo¤ which is obtainable from using this
strategy.19 We shall refer to the event that one element of the memory is
altered as a mistake or a mutation.20
Without noise, a player’s memory changes only for the strategy she used
17Recall that there are H £ Ji items in player i’s memory.
18We could assume that items change with di¤erent probabilities and, as long as all
probabilities are of the same order of magnitude, this would not a¤ect the results. Further
alternatives are discussed in the section 6.
19This assumption ensures that the perturbed Markov process which we are going to
analyse operates on the same state space as the unperturbed process. This helps us keeping
the notation simple.
20There is evidence that items in memory periodically “mutate” (see, e.g., Schatar
1996).
11in the last period, i.e., if she used strategy si in period t, then m(e si;t) =
m(e si;t + 1) for all e si 6= si. In the presence of mutations, each entry in a
player’s memory mi(t) may be altered at each point in time. With such
noise in players’ memories, we obtain a process P" that is aperiodic and
irreducible and, therefore, has a unique stationary distribution ¹" for every
" > 0. We will focus on the limit invariant distribution ¹¤ ´ lim"!0¹".
By standard arguments (see, e.g., Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993), Young
(1993)) we know only states which are elements of absorbing sets under P,
which in our case are all singletons in generic games, can appear in the
support of ¹¤. These states are called stochastically stable states as only
they will be observed with positive probability in the long run. A limited–
memory equilibrium which is played in a stochastically stable state will be
called a stable limited–memory equilibrium (SLME).
De…nition 3 A strategy pro…le s is an SLME if it is an LME and if there
is a state inducing s which has positive probability under ¹¤.
The set of SLME, in general, depends on the exact speci…cation of the
evaluation rule f. That is, for a given game ¡ and a given size H of players’
memories, SLME may be di¤erent for di¤erent evaluation rules. Further-
more, for a given evaluation rule the set of SLME can be di¤erent for games
with identical best reply correspondences. To illustrate this, consider a 2x2
game with two strict equilibria (up;left) and (down;right) which are the
only LME, i.e. the only strategy pro…les played in absorbing states of P.
Also, suppose that the evaluation rule is the average rule, that H is larger
than one, and that players are locked in equilibrium (up;left).
In order to identify SLME we need to analyze how many mutations are
required to switch from one state to the other and how many are required to
switch back. Roughly speaking, the state which can be reached with fewer
mutations will be the stochastically stable one. So, suppose that one element
of the row player’s memory changes such that she switches to strategy down.
The next period’s outcome is (down;left). This will change the row player’s
evaluation of strategy down and the column player’s evaluation of strategy
left. However, to what extent the evaluations change depends on the exact
payo¤s yielded by the strategy combination (down;left). Given that the row
player earns less than in the previously played equilibrium she will surely
return to play up. Now, if the column player’s payo¤ for (down;left) is
only slightly less than the (up;left)–equilibrium payo¤ she may continue
playing strategy left. If, however, the column player’s payo¤ is signi…cantly
lower then she may switch to right. This can induce further movements,
12away from the previously played equilibrium. Accordingly, SLME depend
not only on the ordinal ranking of payo¤s.
Consequently, in this section we restrict our attention to speci…c evalu-
ation rules. In particular, we consider monotonic evaluation rules which, in
contrast to the average rule, induce an ordinal ranking among strategies. In
the next section, we study SLME in classes of games without restricting the
evaluation rules used by the players.
The following result concerns common interest games in which there is
a payo¤ vector that strongly Pareto dominates all other feasible payo¤s.
The result shows that if players have a large enough memory and use the
(optimistic) maximum rule then the Pareto–optimal outcome is the unique
SLME.
Proposition 3 Suppose that players use the maximum evaluation rule and
that H > n. Then, in generic n–player common interest games, the strategy
pro…le s inducing the Pareto–optimal outcome is the unique SLME.
Proof. Let § be the set of absorbing states in which s is played. We …rst
show that from any state outside of §, a state m 2 § can be reached with
at most n simultaneous mutations. This happens if each player i replaces
one element of m(si;t) by ui(s). This induces the players to switch simul-
taneously to si in the next period as the evaluation of si instantaneously
assumes its maximum, which is greater than the maximum evaluation of
any other strategy. Obviously, once they play s, they will continue to play
s such that they will reach a state in § with m(si) = Ui(s) for all players
i. Next, consider how many mutations are necessary to leave §. In order to
make at least one player i change her strategy, all elements of m(si) have to
be replaced by values lower than ui(s), i.e. she has to experience H simulta-
neous mutations. It follows by standard arguments (see, e.g., Vega-Redondo
(1997), Young (1993)) that only states in § are stochastically stable. ¤
This proposition illustrates that players may bene…t from being opti-
mistic and having larger memories. To see the impact of memory size on
the result, suppose that H < n. The e¢cient outcome can still be reached
with n mutations. However, depending on the exact payo¤s, it could now
be possible that one player erases her complete memory of payo¤s obtained
from si (which requires less than n mutations), and keeps playing an alter-
native strategy e si for the next H periods. After this time span all other
players j will remember only uj(e si;s¡i) for their equilibrium strategies sj.
As these payo¤s may be lower than the maximum of payo¤s remembered for
some other strategies e sj, it is possible that some of these players also turn
13away from the equilibrium strategy such that the dynamics will move fur-
ther away from the e¢cient outcome. Hence, without knowing more about
the payo¤ function of the game, it is impossible to predict the SLME.
Our next result is also concerned with players using the maximum rule
and playing certain games where the interests of the players are aligned. We
refer to this class as games with strong common interest.
De…nition 4 A game ¡ is a game of strong common interest if e si = argmaxsi ui(si;s¡i)
implies uj(e si;s¡i) ¸ uj(si;s¡i) for all si;s¡i and j.
This de…nition ensures that all players’ payo¤s weakly increase if a single
player deviates from a non–Nash strategy pro…le to her best reply. Hence,
individual best replies are in the common interest of all players. It is ob-
vious that generic games of strong common interest have a unique Nash
equilibrium which is also the unique Pareto–e¢cient outcome.21
Proposition 4 Suppose that players use the maximum evaluation rule. Then,
in generic n–player games of strong common interest, the unique equilibrium
s is an SLME. If H > 1 then it is also the unique SLME.
Proof. We will show that a state in which the equilibrium is played can be
reached from any other state by a sequence of one–shot mutations. The …rst
claim in the Proposition then follows by standard arguments. To construct
this sequence, consider any state m in which some LME s0 6= s is played. As
s0 is not an equilibrium there exists at least one player i who could obtain
a higher payo¤ by deviating to her best reply. One mutation is su¢cient
to induce this deviation. As soon as this occurs, she will switch to her best
reply while all other players will continue to play s0¡i. (Their new payo¤s
have increased). Thus, the dynamics will reach a new LME. An arbitrary
amount of time can pass. And, if the new LME is also not a the unique
Nash equilibrium, a further single mutation can be constructed in the same
way. Eventually, the dynamics will reach an absorbing state inducing s. In
order to prove the second claim, suppose players are currently in a state
inducing s. It is su¢cient to show that s cannot be left with a sequence of
one-shot mutations. Imagine a mutation which makes one player switch her
strategy. Obviously, this will decrease her payo¤, and, as she still remembers
21Our de…nition of games of strong common interest is related to Monderer and Shapley’s
(1996) de…nition of potential games. However, it is easy to see that the two classes of
games do neither coincide nor that one contains the other. Nevertheless, one can make an
argument similar to their Lemma 2.3 concerning improvement paths to prove this claim
formally.
14the equilibrium payo¤, she will immediately switch back. Furthermore, all
other players will experience payo¤s lower than their equilibrium payo¤s for
their equilibrium strategies. However, as H > 1; they still remember at least
one equilibrium payo¤. As they evaluate their memory by the maximum rule
they will return to the equilibrium strategy. Hence, after a single mutation
the dynamics always lead back to a state inducing s.¤
The last part of the proof illustrates the role of memory size. If H > 1, a
single deviation cannot make the equilibrium payo¤s forgotten. With H = 1,
a single mutation may make player i deviate from her equilibrium strategy
and induce others to also move away from the equilibrium strategy (in the
next round).
Both of our results on SLME depend on players being optimistic. Our
next result reveals that when players are pessimistic elements of risk avoid-
ance may have a strong enough impact to prevent them from coordinating
on a Pareto–dominant equilibrium. The next result considers players who
are pessimistic and use the minimum evaluation rule. It shows that being
pessimistic may lead to less e¢cient outcomes even if memories are large.
Note that the result applies for all generic games and all memory sizes. Let
smaxmin denote the strategy pro…le in which each player plays her maxmin
strategy.
Proposition 5 Suppose players use the minimum rule. Then, in generic
games, smaxmin is an SLME. If smaxmin is, in addition, a Nash equilibrium
then it is the unique SLME.
Proof. In order to prove the …rst statement, we show that a state in which
all players play their maxmin strategies can be reached from any other state
by a sequence of one–shot mutations. The claim then follows by standard ar-
guments. Consider a sequence of one–shot mutations k = 1;2;:::;
P
i(Ji¡1).
Each mutation k replaces one element of player i’s memory of her strategy
si
j 6= si
maxmin. Speci…cally, each mutation replaces one item (or, payo¤)
of player i’s memory of strategy j by the minimum payo¤ that strategy
can give. Once the sequence has been completed, each player evaluates each
strategy according to the minimum payo¤ it can give. This leads each player
to choose her maxmin strategy.
In order to prove the second statement, we show that the state in which
all players play their maxmin strategies requires at least two simultaneous
mutations to be left. Suppose a single mutation would be su¢cient to make
player i switch from her maxmin strategy to a di¤erent si
j. Note that this
can only occur if player i replaces an item in her memory for si
j, i.e., if her
15evaluation of si
j suddenly improves.22 After this switch, all other players will
continue to play their maxmin strategies as they get a payo¤ not smaller
than their maxmin payo¤ and as they remember at least one smaller payo¤
from each of their other strategies. Since mutual maxmin is, by assumption,
a Nash equilibrium it is a strict equilibrium, because of the game is generic.
Consider player i: si
j will give her a strictly lower payo¤ than her maxmin
strategy has given her previously (which she still remembers). Hence, she
will switch back to her maxmin strategy. Thus, the dynamics lead always
back into mutual maxmin play if there is only a single mutation.¤
Whereas Propositions 3 and 4 suggest that optimism (as implied by the
use of the maximum evaluation rule) leads to e¢ciency in some games,23
Proposition 5 shows that pessimism (as implied by the use of the minimum
rule) leads to potentially very bad outcomes in all games. Proposition 4
holds for all memory capacities. This implies that it also holds for the
limiting case of H = 1, when all evaluation rules collapse into one. We
summarize two consequences of Proposition 3 for two much studied games
in the following corollary:24
Corollary 1 Suppose players use the minimum rule or that H = 1. Then
the following statements hold:
a) In 2x2 Prisoners’ Dilemma games, the unique SLME is given by mu-
tual defection.
b) In symmetric 2x2 coordination games in which payo¤ dominance and
risk dominance do not select the same equilibrium, the risk dominant equi-
librium is the unique SLME.
Proof. a)As mutual defection is an equilibrium in dominant strategies the
claim follows immediately. b) Consider the game below with d > b; a > c;




(down;right) is the payo¤ dominant equilibrium and (up;left) is the risk
dominant equilibrium if a + b > c + d, in which case b > c. Hence, up and
left are the maxmin strategies. ¤
22The evaluation of the maxmin strategy cannot fall below the maxmin payo¤.
23Nice properties of optimism have recently been shown in a number of papers including
Gilboa and Schmeidler (1996) and Sarin and Vahid (1999).
24Note that the …rst statement can easily be extended to n–person PD games where
each player has a dominant strategy.
165 Iterated Uniform Dominance
In this section, we turn our attention to looking at a class of games in which
the set of SLME does not depend on the particular evaluation rules the
players use. We begin with some de…nitions.
De…nition 5 A strategy si
j is uniformly dominated if there exists another
strategy si









That is, we say that strategy si
j is uniformly dominated by strategy si
k if
the minimum payo¤ the latter can give is greater than the maximum payo¤
si
j can give. Hence, while cooperation is (strictly) dominated by defection in
the Prisoner’s Dilemma, it is not uniformly dominated. Consider the game
below in which the row player has three strategies (u; m; d) and the column





In this game, m is uniformly dominated for the row player. No other strate-
gies are uniformly dominated for either player.
We now develop the de…nition of the set of strategies that survive the
iterated elimination of uniformly dominated (IUD) strategies. Let ~ Si;1 be
obtained from Si by deleting from the latter all strategies that are uniformly
dominated. Let ~ S1 = £i2I ~ Si;1 denote the set of strategy pro…les that may
be played after each player has removed the uniformly dominated strategies.
It is natural to call ~ S1 the set of strategy pro…les that survive one round of
removal of uniformly dominated strategies. Clearly, this set is non–empty.
In particular, in the Prisoner’s Dilemma no strategy is eliminated by one
round of removal of uniformly dominated strategies. In the game above, one





Next, we construct the set of strategies that survive the elimination of
uniformly dominated strategies in ~ S1 and call this set of strategies ~ S2. In




We similarly construct ~ S3; ~ S4; :::. Observe that ~ Sn+1 ½ ~ Sn for any n.
De…nition 6 The set of strategies which survive the iterated elimination of
uniformly dominated strategies (SIUD) is ~ S1 ´ \1
n=1 ~ Sn.
Clearly, ~ S1 is non–empty. In particular, it is obviously larger than the
set of strategies which survive the iterated removal of (strictly) dominated
strategies (SISD), which is known to be non–empty. It is equal to S in
games in which there does not exist a uniformly dominated strategy, as is
the case in the Prisoner’s Dilemma. In the above game, however, the iterated
elimination of uniformly dominated strategies results in the unique strategy
pro…le (d; l), which is also the unique Nash equilibrium.
De…nition 7 A game is solvable by the iterated elimination of uniformly
dominated strategies if ~ S1 is a singleton.
It is easily seen that if a game is solvable by the iterated elimination of
uniformly dominated strategies, then the game has a unique Nash equilib-
rium. This is because the SISD is contained in the SIUD. As the former
is well known to be non–empty in all games, we know that if the latter is
a singleton, then the former must be also. But, we also know that Nash
equilibrium coincides with the SISD if it is a singleton. Hence, when the
SIUD is a singleton, it coincides with the Nash equilibrium.
Next, we provide a result providing some insight into how players with
limited memories play uniform dominance solvable games.
Proposition 6 In uniform dominance solvable games the unique equilib-
rium s is an SLME.
Proof. We will show that a state in which the equilibrium s is played can be
reached from any other state with a series of one–shot mutations. From this
the claim follows immediately. Let I(l) be the set of players which eliminates
strategies in the lth iteration of eliminating uniformly dominated strategies
and let J(l) be the set of eliminated strategies. Note …rst that strategies
in J(1) are never played. Nevertheless, players can remember outcomes
18in which strategies in J(1) are played, for example, because of the initial
conditions. We start the construction of the sequence of one–shot mutations
by “erasing” these memories. More precisely, we replace all mh(si
j;t) which
resulted from the use of strategies in J(1) by a payo¤ that strategy si
j can
obtain in e S1. Note that this need not happen simultaneously. Rather, an
arbitrary amount of time can pass between mutations. When all payo¤s
stemming from strategies in J(1) have been replaced, it is obvious that
players in I(2) will no longer play strategies in J(2). (Strategies in J(2)
have not been eliminated in the …rst round because they give a maximal
payo¤ higher than the minimum payo¤ of all other strategies. However, as
they can be eliminated in the second round, it is clear that they give this
maximal payo¤ only against strategies in I(1). Otherwise they could not
be eliminated in the second round. But due to the mutations players in
I(2) have now “forgotten” those payo¤s and remember only payo¤s whose
maximum is lower than the minimum of the payo¤s they remember from
some other strategy. Hence, they do not play strategies in J(2).) In the next
subsequence of one–shot mutations all players’ memories of payo¤s resulting
from strategy combinations containing strategies in J(2) are replaced in the
same fashion. As a consequence players in I(3) will no longer use strategies
in J(3). The sequence of mutations is completed by repeating the same
steps until, eventually, players play equilibrium s.¤
The above result places restrictions neither on the memory size of players
nor on the evaluation rule they use. However, without further assumptions,
we cannot show that players will play the equilibrium all the time as we
cannot prove uniqueness for the above case. The reason for this can be easily
illustrated. Suppose player i experiences a single mutation which makes her
switch from si to some other strategy e si. As e si is not a best response against
s¡i, it may happen that she immediately returns to si. However, the single
instance of her playing e si may have caused other players to re–evaluate their
equilibrium strategies. As a consequence of this, several players other than
i may deviate from the equilibrium strategy in the following period (even if
i herself has returned). Thus, to prove uniqueness, we need to know more
speci…c details of the game.
Next, we consider the class of games which are solvable by (standard)
iterative elimination of dominated strategies. As this class contains the class
of uniform dominance solvable games, it is not surprising that an analogous
result requires additional assumptions. The next proposition shows that the
Nash equilibrium in such games is an SLME if players use the minimum
evaluation rule.
19Proposition 7 In dominance solvable games the unique equilibrium s is an
SLME if players use the minimum rule, regardless of memory size.
Proof. The proof is analogous to the one of Proposition 6, and we use the
same notation. The main di¤erence between dominance solvable games and
games solvable by uniform dominance is that in the former players in I(1)
may use strategies in J(1). More generally, players in I(k) may use strategies
in J(k) in the reduced game e Sk¡1. Thus, the sequence of one–shot mutations
to reach s has to be more elaborated. We start the sequence of mutations
by replacing for each strategy si
j 2 J(1) one of the remembered payo¤s by
ui
min(si
j). Between two mutations an arbitrary amount of time can pass.
When all mutations of this …rst subsequence have occurred, players i 2 I(1)
who played strategies in J(1) will have switched to strategies in e Si;1 (where
e Si;1 is now de…ned by applying the standard notion of strict dominance).
Next we proceed—as in the proof of Proposition 6—by replacing all mh(si
j;t)
which resulted from the use of a strategy in J(1) by a payo¤ obtainable
in e S1. However, this does not yet ensure that players i 2 I(2) do not
use strategies in J(2). In order to make them switch to strategies in e Si;2
additional mutations are required. But, as in the …rst subsequence, one
mutation per player is su¢cient to make them switch. If one remembered
payo¤ of a strategy si
j 2 J(2) is replaced by ui
min(si
j) there must be a strategy
si
k 2 e Si;2 for which a greater payo¤ is remembered. Due to the minimum
evaluation rule this implies that the player switches to this strategy. As
soon as the new strategy pro…le is in e S2 we again proceed as in the proof
of Proposition 6. This procedure can be repeated until the equilibrium is
reached.¤
6 Discussion
There are two idealizations about memory that form the core of our model.
First, there is the particular model of limited memory capacity. According
to it, only a …nite number of items could be remembered, and agents re-
membered the same number of items from each strategy, namely the most
recently experienced payo¤s from the respective strategies. Second, there is
the speci…c manner in which this …nite memory capacity is imperfect: Each
item in the memory of a player is forgotten with small positive probabil-
ity which is independent across items, and the forgotten items are replaced
by other plausible items. We turn now to discuss these idealizations about
memory.
20Given our …nite brains and neural content there is compelling case to
suppose that memory capacity is limited. The assumption that the deci-
sion maker remembers the same number of payo¤s from each strategy was
made largely for convenience—it made comparing (or evaluating) alterna-
tive strategies particularly easy since it only involved comparing vectors of
payo¤s of the same dimension. In certain contexts, however, it seems plau-
sible that a player remembers a di¤erent number of payo¤s from each of her
strategies. This could, for instance, arise due to some unmodeled features.
Also, di¤erent players probably remember di¤erent amounts of information.
Therefore, it would be nice if our results were to extend to the situation in
which the number of payo¤s an agent has in her memory depended on who
she was and on the strategy. That is, if H was replaced by a player and
strategy speci…c, Hi
j.
Such a modi…cation requires an extension in the model. Most impor-
tantly, it requires us to specify how players evaluate payo¤ vectors of di¤erent
dimensions. That is, it requires us to specify how players make strategies
comparable when di¤erent amounts of information from each are remem-
bered. If players make strategies comparable in a large class of “plausible”
manners (for a discussion of this see Sarin 1999), we can show that Proposi-
tion 1 and 2 extends to the more general case in which the number of payo¤s
remembered is both, player and strategy speci…c. In order to extend other
results to this case, we have to make further minor modi…cations. Speci…-
cally, we have to replace H with mini;j Hi
j in the statement of Proposition
4. In case of Proposition 5, we need to replace H with Hi
j.
In some situations, it might be reasonable to assume that the amount of
memory allocated to strategies that are not played for a long while begins
to decay. This extension is allowed for in Sarin (1999), in which he shows
that the maxmin result is robust to assuming such decay. In the present
study, we could allow for the same structure and nothing would change in
our analysis without noise, i.e., without additional forgetfulness. But we still
need to understand more details about how our analysis would change if we
allowed these extensions and considered additional forgetfulness in memory.
The assumption that the payo¤s remembered are the most recently expe-
rienced payo¤s from those strategies was to re‡ect the intuition that “more
recent happenings are better remembered” without giving up the …rst as-
sumption. Now suppose that an agent remembers only the most recent K
payo¤s, irrespective of the strategy that was chosen. This requires us to
address how agents evaluate strategies from which they recall no payo¤s.
Potential ways of doing this are discussed in Sarin (1999).
21Another extension of the model of memory would allow the players to
remember certain statistics of the information they observe. Such an exten-
sion, however, would not appear to be consistent with the assumption that
players are myopic. It would be better to analyze the case where the agent
remembers statistics of her past experiences in models which assume that
the players are not myopic. Also, storing summary statistics requires agents
to be more sophisticated than we have assumed.
The second important aspect of the analysis of this paper is that we sup-
pose that the items that are stored in memory are imperfectly stored. There
is plenty of evidence to suggest that people possibly forget any item in their
memory (see, e.g., Schatar 1996). More speci…cally, our model supposed that
each item in memory was forgotten with a small …xed probability. Intuitive
arguments might suggest that agents forget more recent items less frequently
than those stored earlier25 and we could have supposed that items stored
earlier are forgotten with higher probability, as long as all probabilities are
of the same order of magnitude. While we believe that our assumption that
items are forgotten independently of one another and independently of the
current state is a useful …rst approximation, there might be reason to make
di¤erent assumptions for speci…c application. In that case one might want
to introduce “state–dependent” forgetfulness.26
Another assumption we made was that an item that was forgotten was
replaced, and furthermore, that it was replaced by an item that could pos-
sibly have been forgotten. We assumed that forgotten items are replaced
in this manner to ensure that the number of remembered payo¤s remained
constant for all strategies (such that we did not have to deal with the com-
parison of vectors of di¤erent dimensions). We assumed realistic replacement
as it allowed us to work with the same …nite state space. We could have
studied di¤erent replacement rules. For instance, we could have supposed
that forgotten items are replaced by arbitrary items. This would make the
consequences of forgetting more noisy. However, this would not a¤ect our
results for large classes of possible replacement rules because the noise itself
ensures that, in the long run, players experience the real payo¤s of their
strategies. Thus, changes in behavior which are a consequence of “unrealis-
tic” replacements can only be temporary.
25Of course, this is partially re‡ected in how agents utilize their memory in the basic
model. ecent payo¤s are remembered, earlier payo¤s are forgotten.
26This may change the standard results (see, e.g., Bergin and Lipman 1996).
227 Conclusion
The present study takes a …rst step in modelling how players with memory
limitations, who have very little information about their choice environment,
play games. Our preliminary results suggest, …rstly, that players with lim-
ited memories tend to be cautious. This cautiousness is re‡ected by the
emergence of maxmin strategies in various settings. Second, players with
memory limitations tend to do better in games with other players than in a
game with nature. This arises as other players choose in a more determin-
istic manner than does nature, and because other players’ choices may (un-
suspectingly) be in‡uenced. Third, players with severe memory limitations
(H = 1) achieve quite a lot. For example, they learn to use dominant strate-
gies and will play equilibria in dominance solvable games. However, they
fail to coordinate on Pareto–e¢cient equilibria in common interest games
and end up playing the risk–dominant equilibrium. Pessimistic players who
use the minimum rule achieve very similar things as players with minimal
memory. For more optimistic players we have seen that a comparatively
large memory may improve their performance.
Finally, we have seen that in classes of games with especially obvious
solutions, i.e., in games which are solvable by iterated uniform dominance,
the behavior of players with limited memories is robust to memory sizes
and evaluation rules. For games with less obvious solutions this is not true,
although we always know that all players’ payo¤s must be at least as good
as their maxmin payo¤s. Since many games which are relevant in economic
contexts belong to this class, more speci…c studies will be required.
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